Sierra Mike
01-08-2003, 02:22 AM
Over the past few weeks, while North Korea and Iraq both make headlines, there's been a question bandied about that might actually have a cogent--though hidden--answer: Why Iraq and why not North Korea?
Why not indeed, thinks I, from the comparative safety of Fortress America, that bastion of strength protected only a year-and-a-half ago by formidable geography and an inarguably supreme military. Perhaps there's more to it than the casual journalistas, those supposedly objective interpreters of right and wrong and closeted decriers of all things military, could ever see?
To me, it's pretty simple. Iraq now, because it's the easier target. We can refine our tactics and doctrine, test out our newest weapons, TTPs, and force structures. This will be a complex initiative because it involves--perhaps the first time in a century--pretty much a unilateral attack wherein US forces will invade a sovereign nation, overturn a decidedly twisted regime, and in its place, install or assist in the installation of a new, hopefully more democratic, definitely less murderous governing body that will bring Iraq back from the brink. It's for the good of the Iraqis, it's for the good of the region, and it's definitely good for the West. (And here I must define an apparent complexity: Why do I use the word "unilateral" when, in fact, Britain is apparently 100% on board? Because the United Kingdom and the United States share the same world view, in my mind. There is hardly anything the US could ask of the UK that would not be granted; one can only presume the reverse works as well. I cannot for the life of me imagine a cycle of events wherein the UK might be in need, and the US not immediately jump and run to assist.)
A successful operation in Iraq would result more in just the stated goals of the Bush Administration. Whether ultimately successful or not, it does one thing entirely overlooked by the media: it provides the US military with real-world operational experience in invasion and subjugation of an enemy regime. The Second Gulf War will likely be wholly unlike the first in terms of complexity; this is going to be a deep attack, where we will actively pursue and decimate Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard formations. The regular Iraqi Army is unlikely to put up much of a fight; it lacks the specialized training of the other combatants, and is wholly unused to maneuver warfare. The opening stages of the war will effectively leave the regular Iraqi Army, itself a flawless design of centralized command and control, without eyes, ears, and brains. If they leave their revetments, it's likely to be so that they might flee. Here's hoping they don't charge off in the wrong direction, because if they make a movement toward inbound US troop formations, it's likely to be a fatal mistake. US forces are probably disinclined to be halted by thousands of surrendering troops, especially since the message delivered so far has been Do not get involved. Remain where you are.
The lessons of the First Gulf War are effectively useless beyond generating new books for the USMA and other military academies. To be sure, very few of the lessons learned were incorporated into ENDURING FREEDOM; in the First Gulf War, special operations forces were marginally sidelined due to Schwarzkopf's inability to perceive the utility of SOF/LIC contingency operations that could provide hidden and unexpected force multipliers. Clearly, GEN Tommy Franks had a different idea in mind during ENDURING FREEDOM. While a substantial part of the Second Gulf War will involve more traditional military formations--after all, the terrain is beneficial to such--one can also surmise that SOF/LIC will play a paramount role. There are usually legions of detractors in regards to special operations forces, yet they are generally mum when ENDURING FREEDOM comes up. Because, honestly, the largest body of SOF work available to the public was provided courtesy of the Vietnam War, and their contributions have had decades to be subjected to vitriolic attack by the extreme left, as well as merely growing stale with the passage of time.
Clearly, the Second Gulf War will not suffer from the handicaps of history or the parochial views that hobbled Schwarzkopf. Franks, like GEN Wesley Clark during Kosovo, is motivated to use all the tools in the kit to affect a speedy and decisive engagement.
I can only speculate as far as specific tactics that might be used in the Second Gulf War; I won’t detail them here, because as the time draws neigh, it's neither prudent nor wise to advertise what I perceive as advantages our military might exploit. I'm no Clausewitz, but then and again, neither was Stormin' Norman; during the First Gulf War, when we heard about the Great Left Turn down the Tapline Road, even us warrant officers kind of rolled our eyes at the supposed "audacity" Schwarzkopf was demonstrating. Even I knew that an enemy that had been pounded day and night by blistering aviation attacks for 40 days wasn't going anywhere. They weren't going to suddenly displace and stream out of their revetments if they perceived the Hail Mary Play was going into effect. What were they going to do--cross the open desert in the middle of the day?
Regardless, my main thrust of attack is this: the Second Gulf War will help us identify which weapon systems work, where we are doctrinally weak, and determine if the digitization efforts of the past decade have generated a credible gap no adversary is likely to be able to span during combat operations. I'm pretty confident that we'll score well in all areas, whether the situation in Iraq improves drastically or not.
Then we'll use that knowledge and roll in on North Korea.
The DPRK promises to be extremely different from Iraq with regards to the DPRK's warrior ethic, the terrain, the weather, and the geography. At the same time, the DPRK is very much like Iraq in that it favors large, mechanized divisions, fixed gunnery emplacements, a marginal naval force, and an air force that is generally only effective in the daytime. It is one thing for them to attack Seoul; it is entirely another to attack an armored cavalry regiment in advance of an infantry division rolling hot across the DMZ.
The DPRK was not subjected to synchronous attacks on several fronts during the Korean War. Back then, the US did not have the ability to realistically project force onto an enemy in several coordinated axes of attack at the same time.
But it doesn't matter how hard we hit them, if we allow them to hit first…which is why I'm thinking that the DPRK, if it becomes troublesome, will get a righteous beating without any real warning. I think we'll hit them first. Because, really, there is no other way.
Initiative and audacity win wars. Kim Jong Il has both; allowing him to keep them is not in our best interest.
SM
Why not indeed, thinks I, from the comparative safety of Fortress America, that bastion of strength protected only a year-and-a-half ago by formidable geography and an inarguably supreme military. Perhaps there's more to it than the casual journalistas, those supposedly objective interpreters of right and wrong and closeted decriers of all things military, could ever see?
To me, it's pretty simple. Iraq now, because it's the easier target. We can refine our tactics and doctrine, test out our newest weapons, TTPs, and force structures. This will be a complex initiative because it involves--perhaps the first time in a century--pretty much a unilateral attack wherein US forces will invade a sovereign nation, overturn a decidedly twisted regime, and in its place, install or assist in the installation of a new, hopefully more democratic, definitely less murderous governing body that will bring Iraq back from the brink. It's for the good of the Iraqis, it's for the good of the region, and it's definitely good for the West. (And here I must define an apparent complexity: Why do I use the word "unilateral" when, in fact, Britain is apparently 100% on board? Because the United Kingdom and the United States share the same world view, in my mind. There is hardly anything the US could ask of the UK that would not be granted; one can only presume the reverse works as well. I cannot for the life of me imagine a cycle of events wherein the UK might be in need, and the US not immediately jump and run to assist.)
A successful operation in Iraq would result more in just the stated goals of the Bush Administration. Whether ultimately successful or not, it does one thing entirely overlooked by the media: it provides the US military with real-world operational experience in invasion and subjugation of an enemy regime. The Second Gulf War will likely be wholly unlike the first in terms of complexity; this is going to be a deep attack, where we will actively pursue and decimate Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard formations. The regular Iraqi Army is unlikely to put up much of a fight; it lacks the specialized training of the other combatants, and is wholly unused to maneuver warfare. The opening stages of the war will effectively leave the regular Iraqi Army, itself a flawless design of centralized command and control, without eyes, ears, and brains. If they leave their revetments, it's likely to be so that they might flee. Here's hoping they don't charge off in the wrong direction, because if they make a movement toward inbound US troop formations, it's likely to be a fatal mistake. US forces are probably disinclined to be halted by thousands of surrendering troops, especially since the message delivered so far has been Do not get involved. Remain where you are.
The lessons of the First Gulf War are effectively useless beyond generating new books for the USMA and other military academies. To be sure, very few of the lessons learned were incorporated into ENDURING FREEDOM; in the First Gulf War, special operations forces were marginally sidelined due to Schwarzkopf's inability to perceive the utility of SOF/LIC contingency operations that could provide hidden and unexpected force multipliers. Clearly, GEN Tommy Franks had a different idea in mind during ENDURING FREEDOM. While a substantial part of the Second Gulf War will involve more traditional military formations--after all, the terrain is beneficial to such--one can also surmise that SOF/LIC will play a paramount role. There are usually legions of detractors in regards to special operations forces, yet they are generally mum when ENDURING FREEDOM comes up. Because, honestly, the largest body of SOF work available to the public was provided courtesy of the Vietnam War, and their contributions have had decades to be subjected to vitriolic attack by the extreme left, as well as merely growing stale with the passage of time.
Clearly, the Second Gulf War will not suffer from the handicaps of history or the parochial views that hobbled Schwarzkopf. Franks, like GEN Wesley Clark during Kosovo, is motivated to use all the tools in the kit to affect a speedy and decisive engagement.
I can only speculate as far as specific tactics that might be used in the Second Gulf War; I won’t detail them here, because as the time draws neigh, it's neither prudent nor wise to advertise what I perceive as advantages our military might exploit. I'm no Clausewitz, but then and again, neither was Stormin' Norman; during the First Gulf War, when we heard about the Great Left Turn down the Tapline Road, even us warrant officers kind of rolled our eyes at the supposed "audacity" Schwarzkopf was demonstrating. Even I knew that an enemy that had been pounded day and night by blistering aviation attacks for 40 days wasn't going anywhere. They weren't going to suddenly displace and stream out of their revetments if they perceived the Hail Mary Play was going into effect. What were they going to do--cross the open desert in the middle of the day?
Regardless, my main thrust of attack is this: the Second Gulf War will help us identify which weapon systems work, where we are doctrinally weak, and determine if the digitization efforts of the past decade have generated a credible gap no adversary is likely to be able to span during combat operations. I'm pretty confident that we'll score well in all areas, whether the situation in Iraq improves drastically or not.
Then we'll use that knowledge and roll in on North Korea.
The DPRK promises to be extremely different from Iraq with regards to the DPRK's warrior ethic, the terrain, the weather, and the geography. At the same time, the DPRK is very much like Iraq in that it favors large, mechanized divisions, fixed gunnery emplacements, a marginal naval force, and an air force that is generally only effective in the daytime. It is one thing for them to attack Seoul; it is entirely another to attack an armored cavalry regiment in advance of an infantry division rolling hot across the DMZ.
The DPRK was not subjected to synchronous attacks on several fronts during the Korean War. Back then, the US did not have the ability to realistically project force onto an enemy in several coordinated axes of attack at the same time.
But it doesn't matter how hard we hit them, if we allow them to hit first…which is why I'm thinking that the DPRK, if it becomes troublesome, will get a righteous beating without any real warning. I think we'll hit them first. Because, really, there is no other way.
Initiative and audacity win wars. Kim Jong Il has both; allowing him to keep them is not in our best interest.
SM